Overview of the of the main changes since the previous report update

Author

Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Visit Website

The report was previously updated in April 2025.

National context

After nearly five years of constitutional crisis since May 2021, which led to a series of seven general elections, six caretaker cabinets, one regular and one rotational government, the last election – taking place in October 2024 – produced a regular government, which took office in January 2025.[1] It was formed as a coalition between the parties GERB (ГЕРБ), ITN (ИТН), and BSP (БСП). The first of them, GERB, led by Boyko Borissov, governed the country with brief interruptions from 2009 to 2021, and is therefore perceived by the public as mainly accountable for the current severe political and economic crisis and overwhelming corruption. The second, ITN, positioned as an anti-establishment party founded by a former TV show host, and the third – the ex-communist party BSP – were both sharing pro-Russian and anti-European political views and agendas. All decisions of the government in 2025, however, were also consistently not only supported, but also navigated by the party DPS–New Beginning (ДПС-НН), led by Delyan Peevski, sanctioned[2] in 2021 under the US Global Magnitsky Act. This party was formed in 2024 and, by mid-2025, had managed to take over the structures of the DPS (ДПС) party[3]. The latter was established in the early 1990s, formally as a party representing the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, but in fact as a project of the former communist security services[4]. According to several public admissions[5] by its founder and long-time leader Ahmed Dogan, it was the party that had effectively ruled the country over the past 30 years through blatant influence peddling[6]. Public opinion[7] mostly considers the GERB, BSP and DPS parties primarily responsible for causing the present state of inescapable corruption, shattered economy, politically subdued judiciary, suffocated media and mass manipulations of election votes. The government opposition, the self-proclaimed as liberal opposition party PP (ПП) in coalition with Democratic Bulgaria (ДБ) found themselves under institutional attacks[8], persecution through criminal prosecution[9] and therefore continue failing to bring balance and prevent even worse legal and practical arrangements, relentlessly introduced by the government or the majority in the parliament aiming at removing the last standing standards and safeguards of the democratic governance and justice within the society. However, the growing public discontent over years of poor governance, rampant corruption, and the lack of justice erupted in November–December 2025, when the government proposed the draft budget for the following year, in which spending on the state administration and investment projects were significantly increased at the expense of a corresponding rise in the tax burden on population and the private sector. For the first time, mass civic protests were held not only in the capital, Sofia, but also in most major cities across the country, as well as in various European cities with large Bulgarian diaspora communities[10], on 26 November and 1 December, culminating on 10 December[11], International Human Rights Day, when the protest in the capital alone gathered more than 150,000 people[12]. The following day, the government resigned[13], and Bulgaria began preparations for its eighth snap elections in the past five years[14], which were scheduled for 19 April 2026. [15]

This political situation had an extremely negative impact on Bulgaria’s national asylum system. The government formed in January 2025 assigned to Vice PM Atanas Zafirov (BSP)[16] the responsibility of exercising political oversight over the national asylum authority — the State Agency for Refugees (SAR). On 4 June 2025, at his proposal and without providing any justification, the government dismissed[17] SAR expert leadership, appointed in April 2022, which had successfully managed both the crisis involving Ukrainian refugees in the same year[18] and the following crisis related to the highest number of third-country nationals applying for international protection in 2024[19]. Two long retired army colonels were appointed instead as chairperson[20] and deputy chairperson[21] of the State Agency for Refugees. The latter has been appointed twice by GERB as a chairperson of the asylum agency (2010–2013 / 2015–2016) and twice dismissed by the very governments that had appointed him. His first dismissal came in 2013 on account of him causing a severe humanitarian crisis[22], where the reception conditions for asylum seekers, most of whom from Syria, were unanimously described[23] as inhuman and degrading. Subsequently, he was reinstated as SAR chairperson (2015–2016), only to be dismissed shortly due to alleged irregularities[24] in public procurement procedures for food supplies in refugee reception centres.

EU Pact on Migration and Asylum

In this political and institutional context, as described in the paragraph above, preparations for the implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum stalled. According to the National Plan for Pac implementation adopted by the government[25], alongside other technical and organizational measures, two key legislative amendments were envisaged: the drafting of an entirely new Law on Asylum and Refugees, with a deadline for adoption of 31 December 2025[26], as well as amendments to the provisions of the primary and secondary immigration legislation in order to establish rules for screening and detention of third-country nationals after the expiry of the 24-hour police arrest period, again with a deadline for adoption[27] by 31 December 2025. Other measures in the Plan provided for the establishment of screening centres under the General Directorate Border Police (GDBP) in Elhovo and Dragoman, as well as the construction of three screening centres for the immigration police (Directorate Migration, DM) — two for unaccompanied minors: one in Sofia, with a capacity of 50 places, and one in Elhovo, with a capacity of 90 places; and one screening centre in Lyubimets for irregular third-country nationals identified within the interior of the country, with a capacity of 540 places.

As of the date of this report, none of the measures described above had been implemented. While the delay in establishing the screening centres is not critical, given that the police authorities are adapting for this purpose buildings within already existing police detention facilities, the fact that relevant legislation has not yet been amended might lead to missing the deadline of 12 June 2026. Nevertheless, amendments to the primary immigration legislation relating screening procedure have been finalized by the Ministry of Interior, and their publication for public consultation, concluded on 4 May 2026,[28] though its submission to Parliament initially planned[29] for April 2026 will be further delayed. However, the adoption of the new Law on Asylum and Refugees has been drastically compromised. On 24 February 2025, an inter-institutional working group under the State Agency for Refugees began work on the draft law, and by mid-May 2025 four chapters had been prepared and agreed upon. Following the dismissal of the Agency’s leadership on 4 June 2025, the inter-institutional working group did not hold a single meeting until 7 November 2025, when the participating government stakeholders were invited to be presented with a final version of an entirely different draft law prepared by legal experts of the Agency. Despite the predominantly negative opinion expressed on this draft by the members of the inter-institutional working group, in January 2026 the caretaker government published the draft law for public consultation[30] without having conducted the formal inter-ministerial coordination procedure with the ministries and other competent authorities. By the close of the public consultation procedure on 25 February 2026, all opinions submitted on the draft law were against its adoption as failing to provide even the most basic procedural arrangements, required for the implementation of the Pact’s provisions.[31]

International protection 

Asylum procedure

• Access to the territory: Intensified border control measures were applied from the beginning of 2025 as part of the conditions, agreed by Austria to consent for Bulgaria’s full Schengen accession on 1 January 2025. It comprised the deployment of 1,200 national border police officers and 240 Frontex officials in mixed land patrol teams. Additionally, another 100 officers from various countries, including 40 Romanian, 15 Austrian, 20 Hungarian, and 25 Bulgarian border guards began operation since 3 February 2025[32]. The border surveillance was also updated with new echolocation equipment, drones and high passable vehicles. These combined measures resulted in 64% overall decrease in the annual number of apprehended newly arrived irregular third country nationals (3,306 migrants) in comparison with the previous year (9,208 migrants). The changes in the political situation in Syria at the end of 2024, and mass deportations of Afghan nationals from Iran in the summer of 2025 – both nationalities that have been the first two top arrivals to Bulgaria over the last decade -, also led to a decrease of the border pressure and the number of the prevented irregular entries, which marked 72% decrease (2025: 13,568 prevented entries / 2024: 52,534 prevented entries). Although officially referred to as irregular migrants, who before entering the border with Bulgaria voluntarily decided to return back to the territory of neighbouring countries (i.e. Türkiye),[33] monitoring shows[34] that these numbers represent to a great extent those who attempted to enter the country, but were pushed back either at the border or apprehended while already on Bulgarian territory after an irregular border crossing. At the same time, the percentage of irregular migrants officially apprehended at the border with Türkiye (90%) remained the highest when compared to other borders.[35] Since 2014, for ten consecutive years, the percentage of irregular migrants successfully entering from Türkiye has remained significantly low compared to those apprehended at exit borders or within the territory, largely due to the widespread practice of pushbacks at this border (see, Asylum procedure, Access to the territory and push backs). This increase is seen as a result of the involvement of Frontex and other EU countries deployment in mixed border patrols along the land border with Türkiye. Once officially arrested, irregular migrants are provided with information on available legal procedures and can apply for international protection either at 24-hour border detention facilities or after their transfer to pre-removal (detention) centres inland. The overall decline in new arrivals entering from neighbouring Türkiye has also led to a significant 68% drop in registered asylum applications, with just 3,895 applicants in 2025 compared to 12,250 in the previous year. However, 15% of asylum applications (589 applicants) were submitted by the so called self-reported third-country nationals, who are irregular migrants able to enter and move within the country without been detected or apprehended by any of the police authorities. Another 22,333 Ukrainians[36] were registered under the temporary protection scheme during the year. At the end a 2024, a total of 60,864 temporary protection holders[37] were reported as remaining in the country. However, this information was not updated and kept available throughout 2025, with only official statistics shared as of 30 June 2025, namely – 67,425 temporary protection holders[38]. Thus, it can be reasonable presumed that in 2025 the national asylum system was engaged with 71,320 persons, seeking or enjoying some of the available types of protection in Bulgaria.
• Access to the procedure: Asylum applicants continued to be deprived of direct access to the asylum procedure when apprehended at the border. Just 1.75% of those who were apprehended on the entry border with Türkiye and within the so-called Kapikule-Ormenion-Svilengrad border triangle received direct access to registration and accommodation in a SAR reception centre without first being sent and detained in a MOI deportation centre.[39] On the contrary, since 2022, the SAR started to grant immediate and unhindered access to the asylum procedure to ‘self-reported’ asylum seekers (see, Asylum Procedure, Registration of asylum application). ‘Self-reported’ asylum seekers are those who managed to enter and reach SAR registration centres independently, without being apprehended by the police and detained. In the past, the asylum agency consistently refused to register them directly, instead alerting the police, which then arrested and detained them in deportation centres of the Ministry of the Interior. In some cases, this malpractice was affecting families with minor children and pregnant women. This trend changed from 2022, when this practice affected a total of 94 persons (0.5%) out of 20,407 asylum seekers registered in the country. In 2023, only 48 asylum seekers (0.2%) out of 22,518 suffered from this practice, in 2024 it affected 83 asylum seekers (0.4%) out of 12,250 persons who had lodged an asylum application, where in 2025 it affected 1% (4 persons) out of 3,895 asylum applicants.[40] Out of 2,819 asylum seekers registered 0.02% (1 applicant) had their procedure conducted irregularly[41] in a MOI deportation centre.[42] Following these improvements, some smugglers adapted quickly and began to deliver smuggled persons directly to open SAR reception centres in Harmanli, Banya and Sofia with many among them with settled representation by private practitioners and false proof of registration at an external address. In January 2025, the head of the Sofia Migration Directorate was arrested for alleged corruption and, among other charges, for alleged registration of false addresses of third country nationals.[43]
• Absconding and secondary movements: The absconding rate continued to decrease in 2025. 34% (2,428 persons) out of 9,946 asylum seekers with pending cases abandoned their asylum procedure in Bulgaria.[44] This represented a decrease of nearly 10% compared to 39% in 2024, 48% of the total registered in 2023, on the background of 46% in 2022, 26% in 2021, 39% in 2020, and 83% in 2019. The main reasons motivating asylum seekers to abandon their asylum procedures in Bulgaria and abscond were the poor reception conditions, low recognition rates for some nationalities, as well as the lack of any integration support or programs provided by the State (see, Reception Conditions).
• Length and quality of the procedure: In 2025, the SAR issued decisions for 7,090 asylum applicants. Out of this number, 3,895 asylum seekers applied in 2025, while 6,051 asylum seekers had pending cases from 2024.[45] Out of the total number of decisions,[46] 62 granted refugee status, 897 humanitarian status (subsidiary protection under the QD), 3,703 were rejections (of which 1,566 taken in an accelerated procedure) and 2,428 were decisions discontinuing the procedure, mainly due to absconding. It represented an average of 591 decisions taken monthly, issued by 29 case workers (2024: 675 decisions monthly average by 27 case workers) including decisions on termination of procedure due to absconding, or an average of 389 decisions on the merits per month. The average length of the procedure remained between 4 and 6 months.[47] Some improvements in the standards and quality of the asylum procedure were also observed, however other procedural areas showed deterioration[48]. The quality of status determination procedures may worsen in 2026 as far as due to financial constraints UNHCR pulled out all from the national reception centres all of its partner non-governmental activities, including the monitoring of national asylum procedure. This reduction of support was partially compensated by UNICEF, which as of 1 January 2026 commenced monitoring on observation of fundamental rights of children in asylum procedures.
• Recognition and refusal rates: In 2025, the overall recognition rate decreased to 20%, from 61% in 2024, 66% in 2023 and 91% in 2022 of all decisions on the merits. Both refugee recognition and subsidiary protection rates continued to decrease. Refugee recognition decreased to 0.1%[49] and subsidiary protection (defined as ‘humanitarian status’ under national law) rates fell to 19% in 2025.[50] The rejection rate reached 80%,[51] when considering only decisions issued on the substance of asylum claims. The top 5 countries of origin of asylum seekers entering Bulgaria in 2025 were Morocco, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Previously, applicants from Syria and Afghanistan constituted the overwhelming majority of asylum application in Bulgaria for a period over a decade, including the previous 2024. The shift was caused by two main factors. Afghan nationals continued to face reduced recognition in 2025, as in 2024 and 2023, with an overall recognition rate of just 4% (0.3% refugee status and 3.7% subsidiary protection) and a 96% rejection rate.[52] The majority (78%) of Afghan applicants[53] continued to abscond before receiving a first instance decision, which was issued on the merits in 22% of the caseload.[54] Additionally, more than 1.5 million Afghans have been forced back to Afghanistan from Iran in 2025[55], followed by a blockade of the border between the two countries thus preventing to a large extent onward movements to EU. The most radical change, however, related to the drop of recognition rates of Syrian applicants. Since 2014, Syrian applicants have been treated as prima facie refugees with the majority of them granted subsidiary protection based on the understanding that they flee from internal armed conflict[56] (see, Differential treatment of specific nationalities in the procedure). Starting from mid-2024 the SAR initiated individual assessment of Syrian applications, which in 2025 resulted in a 64.2% rejection and 35.8% recognition rate (1.8% refugee recognition rate and 34% subsidiary protection).
• Relocation and resettlement: Since 2015, Bulgaria relocated or resettled a total of 313 individuals. Relocation was conducted with respect to 180 people, of whom 76 from Greece, 10 from Italy and 94 from Cyprus. Since the EU-Türkiye deal, out of the agreed number of 110 individuals, in total 133 Syrian refugees have been resettled. In 2025, two Syrian families with a total of 14 individuals were resettled in Bulgaria from Türkiye.
• Legal aid and assistance: The general legal aid system was introduced in Bulgaria in 2005, extending it to court representation in all types of cases beyond its mandatory provision in criminal, child protection and tort disputes. In 2017, the scope of the legal aid was extended^[57] to include oral consultations at the national help line^[58] or in regional legal aid centres. The condition for legal aid to be provided is for the person in need of support to lack means and resources to engage a lawyer privately against remuneration, which have to be assessed by the court or the National Bureau for Legal Aid (NLAB)[59]. In practice, due to insufficient NLAB budget^[60], free legal aid is only provided to vulnerable persons – Bulgarians or third country nationals^[61] upon their explicit written request. NLAB is situated solely in the capital Sofia without regional offices across the country, and it functions with 23 staff members, who are also responsible for all other national caseload where legal aid should be mandatory rendered, e.g. criminal trials, parental disputes, etc. Therefore, in practice it is impossible for refused asylum seekers to secure legal aid for submission of an appeal in the very tight 7- or 14-days deadlines. Same constraints apply with respect to legal aid provided in regional legal aid centers of local bars[62] which since 2015 have been gradually establishing across the country, where along the lack of expertise in refugee law an additional hindrance also constitutes thе lack of financial means for interpretation between lawyers and asylum seekers. As a result, since the establishment of the national asylum authority in 1994, asylum seekers relied entirely on NGOs or private practitioners for those who have sufficient financial means to afford it for their access to the court, namely for drafting and lodging the appeal and subsequent representation during litigation. Therefore, the main support in this respect has historically been provided by the non-governmental organisation Bulgarian Helsinki Committee as UNHCR’s main legal implementing partner since the establishment of the national asylum system in 1994. However, due to UN financial crisis BHC was forced to close its legal reception offices on 1 January 2026[63], thus leaving asylum seekers without a reliable free of charge legal assistance for access to court and timely submission of appeals before the court against negative decisions refusing or revoking international protection. The only free-of-charge legal assistance that remained readily available in this respect[64] is once every two weeks in Sofia, Harmanli and Pastrogor at limited reception time. This assistance, however, will also end on 30 June 2026. (see Regular Procedure – Legal Assistance at first instance and Legal assistance in appeals)

Reception conditions

• Reception centres: Since 2015, the conditions in all national reception centres have been gradually deteriorating, with support limited to accommodation, nutrition and rudimentary medical help without provision of psychological care or assistance.^[65] In 2022, a SAR internal revision of the reception centres’ capacity revealed it[66] to be far below its long-time declared 5,160 places, mainly because the designated premises were unfit for living. In 2025, SAR reported just 3,125 places available for accommodation in all of its reception centres.[67] During the period from 2022 to mid-2025 the SAR management were largely seen as a merely expert one[68], without any political endorsement or support, which resulted in severely underfunded agency’s budget, respectively[69], in 2022:14,095,300 BGN; in 2023: 12,038,218 BGN and in 2024: 11,717,200 BGN. The only budget allocated during this period for repairs or refurbishment[70] of the reception centres was of 145,000 BGN in 2022 with no such means allocated in the 2020, 2021, 2023 or 2024 annual budgets of the asylum agency. In 2025 however, due to the political appointment of a SAR leadership[71] by the government, the SAR received a budget of BGN 16,000,000, of which BGN 3,900,000 solely for capital investments and refurbishment. Notwithstanding, reception centres accommodating applicants during their asylum procedure continued to face persistent issues related to infrastructure and living conditions, often falling below basic standards. In many cases, they failed to provide even the most essential services, including adequate nutrition and sanitation in both personal and communal spaces. Access to regular and hot water, as well as maintenance and repairs in bathrooms, rooms, and common areas, remained highly problematic due to the absence of a dedicated budget for upkeep. Long-standing issues such as infestations of bedbugs, lice, cockroaches, and rats persisted across facilities. The Ovcha Kupel shelter in Sofia, the oldest reception centre, deteriorated to such an extent that at one point, the previous SAR management considered its complete closure.[72] By the end of 2025, the only remaining functional space within the facility continued to be the safe zone for unaccompanied children, managed by the IOM. Residents across all reception centres, except for the Pastrogor transit centre, which remained closed for the duration of 2025 until December, continued to express concerns about poor living conditions, and particularly the persistent issue of bedbug infestations, which frequently led to health problems such as chronic skin inflammations and allergic reactions. Despite regular disinfections throughout 2025, the issue, which first emerged in 2013 and was largely neglected until 2023, remained a serious and ongoing concern.[73] Food in reception centres was provided through catering arrangements to deliver three meals per day. As catering providers are selected regionally based on the lowest price offer,[74] these vary among the different reception centres. Thus, in the Ovcha Kupel, Voenna Rampa and Vrazhdebna shelters and in the Sofia reception centre these three meals per day were delivered at the price of BGN 5.38, equal to EUR 2.75; in the Harmanli reception center – at the price of BGN[75] 6.54, equal to EUR 3.35; in the Banya reception centre – at the price of BGN 6.24, equal to EUR 3.20; and in the Pastrogor transit centre – at the price of BGN 6.01, equal to EUR 3.08 daily. The individual monthly allowance provided for in the law is not translated into practice as it is not provided since 2015.[76] For this reason, in 2025 asylum seekers continued to complain not only about food quality, but also about its insufficient quantity. The main factor that helped avoiding a point of critical malnutrition for asylum seekers was the drastic 68% decrease of the new arrivals in 2025 and still significant rate of absconding and abandonment of the procedure, which was 34% of the caseload. Asylum seekers continued to face significant barriers in accessing consistent and specialized healthcare due to the country’s chronic shortage of general practitioners. The medical care of asylum seekers was mainly carried out in the surgeries organised in Sofia and Harmanli reception centres, with a total of 3,298 initial medical examinations and 2,144 outpatient examinations in 2025,[77] provided in reception centres by 4 doctors, 1 dentist (RRC Harmanli) and 5 nurses. Even though asylum seekers are health insured, due to its budget restraints SAR fail to meet the medical expenses, which are not covered by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). These costs as well as those for prescribed medicines, lab tests or other medical interventions which are not covered in the health care package, as well as for purchase of baby formula, diapers and other personal hygiene products were provided by the Red Cross, UNICEF and UNHCR.[78] For many years, the most serious concern relating national reception conditions remained the lack safety and security for asylum seekers accommodated in reception centres. These continued to be seriously compromised due to the presence of smugglers, drug dealers and sex workers who had access to all reception centres during the night hours without any interference from the private security guards. The SAR has been receiving many public disorder complaints both in Sofia and Harmanli, which escalated in public demonstrations and committees requesting the reception facilities to be either closed or turned to closed-type centres.[79] In 2022[80] and 2023,[81] a non-governmental organisation continued raising concerns regarding safety of reception centres. Starting from mid-2022, the SAR submitted several requests to the Ministry of Interior,[82] to engage the police in guarding of the reception centres, but the MOI initiated a procedure in this sense only by the end of 2023,[83] to investigate the possibility for SAR reception centres to be guarded by the national police and gendarmerie. In April 2024, additional amendments to the law were made,[84] but the MOI took over the guarding of the reception centres of the SAR as late as in October 2025.[85] This major change is expected to improve the safety and security of asylum seekers who are accommodated in the reception centres.
• Safe zone for unaccompanied children: The two safe zones for unaccompanied children at the Sofia reception centre continued to be maintained under an IOM project, funded by AMIF until the end of 2025. In 2024, a third safe zone with a capacity for 98 children was opened[86] in the biggest reception centre in Harmanli, following a collaboration with UNICEF and IOM, funded by the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM). Overall, the conditions in the safe zones were better compared to all other SAR accommodation premises. The abovementioned serious security problems existing in reception centres and their surroundings in 2025 however also affected the overall safety of unaccompanied children. Improvements in this respect are expected following the security being handed over to the police (see, the paragraph above). In 2025, the number of unaccompanied children who sought protection in Bulgaria decreased by 78%.[87] Therefore, the capacity of the three safe zones, totalling 386 places,[88] proved sufficient to accommodate all newcomers, but mainly because the high absconding rate (82%)[89] continued to be a systemic issue regarding the treatment of unaccompanied children. Starting in 2022, SAR began to invest systematic efforts in providing unaccompanied children with accommodation in specialized child care facilities. By 2025, the percentage of children benefiting from this more suitable form of care continued to gradually increase.[90]
• Access to benefits: Asylum seekers who decide to live outside reception centres at their own expenses are not entitled to social benefits.[91] Asylum seekers who are not self-sufficient are entitled to accommodation in the available reception centres, three meals per day, basic medical assistance and psychological support,[92] even though the latter is not secured in practice. In 2025, SAR carried out 74 psychological interviews in application of the SOPs for vulnerability identification and referred unknown number of applicants to the non-governmental organization Nadya Center for further support or treatment[93]. Monthly cash allowance is not provided since 2015 [94] until 27 July 2025 when it was reinstated with an amendment of the internal rules of the asylum agency[95] in amount of BGN 20, increased to BGN 30 from 1 August 2025[96]. Access to any other social benefits under the EU acquis is not guaranteed by law, nor provided in practice, still raising concerns about compliance with Articles 17, 18 and 25 of the 2013/33 Reception Conditions Directive or Articles 19 and 20 of the 2024/1346 Reception Conditions Directive.
• Access to the labour market: During the asylum procedure, asylum seekers have unconditional access to the labour market after a period of three months from their registration.^[97] In 2025, the State Refugee Agency issued 847 work permits to asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection who were looking to support themselves while their asylum claims were being processed.^[98] Out of them, only 2% (3 asylum seekers and 16 persons granted international protection) were employed through employment programs, while the rest found work independently and on their own initiative.^[99] At the same time, a total of 315 persons with temporary protection were employed through employment programs.[100]

Detention of asylum seekers

• Detention in pre-removal centres: In 2025, the average duration of detention was of 3 working or 5 calendar days,[101] in full conformity with the law.[102] This could also be attributed to the 68% decrease[103] in the number of asylum seekers in the country compared to previous year, which eased processing of new arrivals by the detention administration. As a result, of all third-country nationals who applied for protection in a police detention centre, 87%[104] were released within the statutory deadline, and no one was unlawfully detained for more than 6 months. First introduced in 2015, the SAR practice of registering asylum seekers in police pre-removal (detention) centres to meet the registration deadline,[105] as well as conducting proceedings and delivering decisions in these detention centres, was not sanctioned by national courts,[106] which in most cases regarded it as an infringement of the procedure of limited importance. Starting in 2022, the SAR took significant steps to address this malpractice, ultimately achieving its complete elimination by 2024, with no registrations or determinations conducted in a police pre-removal detention centre. However, in 2025 SAR again resumed this malpractice, though applied in just one individual case, which consisted 0.02% of the caseload.[107]
• Detention in closed reception centres: National legislation allows detention pending the asylum procedure, although on limited grounds and for the shortest period possible.[108] Since the introduction of the provision,[109] in total 269 asylum seekers have been detained in closed reception centres[110] pending their status determination situation, mainly based on national security grounds, of whom 31 asylum seekers in 2025.[111] The average duration of detention in closed reception centres increased, reaching 89 days on average in 2025.[112]

Content of international protection

• Civil registration: To be registered in the national database, any beneficiary of international protection has to indicate, inter alia, a domicile.^[113] Following the peak of arrivals and recognitions in 2014-2016 the newly recognised beneficiaries who have lived in reception centres were no longer permitted by the SAR to state the address of the respective reception centre as domicile. Therefore, since the end of 2016 beneficiaries of international protection could not provide a valid address or domicile in order to be registered in national civil registrations database and obtain national ID number, which is a prerequisite to be issued a valid identity document. This legal ‘catch 22’ has led to continuous malpractices, including false renting and address registrations for the sake of enabling beneficiaries to obtain identity documents, as the valid identity document is a pre-condition to exercising their rights. Following extensive advocacy efforts from civil society organisations, the law was amended in October 2024,[114] to enable[115] the newly recognised refugees and subsidiary protection holders who cannot state a domicile address when registering for the first time in the population register, or applying for a permanent or current address, to be registered at an officially prescribed service address by the municipality where they have established their habitual residence. This provision was auxiliary to same arrangements introduced for nationals without official domicile, and entered into force on 8 December 2024, with all municipalities obliged until 8 January 2025 to assign service address or addresses to be able to implement the new arrangement. In total, 13,130 beneficiaries of international protection – respectively, 5,144 refugee status holders and 7,986 subsidiary protection holders – were issued identity documents on the basis of assigned service address[116] since the entry into force of the arrangement until 31 December 2025.
• Integration: In 2025, no data was shared for integration agreements concluded with respect to family members.[117] No other integration measures or activities were planned, funded or available to individuals granted international protection – refugee or humanitarian status. On 2 May 2025 the government finally adopted[118] a Program for Humanitarian Assistance and Integration of displaced persons from Ukraine under temporary protection in Bulgaria. However, the so-called integration measures consist of enlisting different agencies and institutions and their competencies with respect to ensure access to certain integration related rights, rather than real and concrete measures of material assistance, employment or other support for integration. Thus, Bulgaria marked its 12^th year of the national “zero integration” policy.
• Special measures for unaccompanied children: The asylum authority, SAR, continued to actively search opportunities to accommodate unaccompanied children in licensed family-type children’s centres (ЦНСТ). During the asylum procedure such efforts were undertaken mainly regarding minor asylum-seeking children,[119] children with special needs or such identified as being at increased risk of trafficking or harm. After recognition, these efforts targeted all unaccompanied children, excluding those in family reunification procedures, who were allowed to wait for the reunification with their parents or other family members in SAR reception centres.[120] As a result of this positive practice, a total of 41 unaccompanied children were accommodated during the course of the year in specialized childcare centres, of whom 11 were asylum seeking children and 30 children granted international protection. Altogether 12 residential child care facilities across the country were engaged as well as 4 foster housings (foster families or relatives). At the same time, it is important to consider the lack of specialized institutional training for the childcare centres’ staff to work with unaccompanied children seeking or granted protection, as well as the absence of funding for interpretation services, at least during the initial period of accommodation and adjustment.
• Cessation and withdrawal: National law envisaged an additional cessation clause compared to the 1951 Refugee Convention.[121] The law permitted cessation or revocation of the international protection if the status holders fail, in a period of thirty days, to renew their expired Bulgarian identity documents or to replace them if they have been lost, stolen or destroyed. The undue cessation of international protection has affected 4,405 status holders in total since then, respectively – 770 persons in 2018; 2,608 persons in 2019; 886 persons in 2020 and 100 persons in 2021 and 41 persons in 2022. In 2024, this malpractice was fully abandoned by SAR, with 0 cessations made on this additional ground. In 2025 the SAR ceased 850 granted statuses, of which 292 refugee statuses and 558 subsidiary protections (humanitarian statuses). As far as known, there was no indication or statement made with respect to the legal ground for these cessations it cannot be concluded with certainty that the SAR resumed the malpractice.

Temporary protection (see Temporary Protection Annex)

Temporary protection procedure

• Key statistics on temporary protection: As of 31 December 2025, a total of 223,817 were registered under temporary protection. Out of this number, 52,535 were men, 107,422 women and 63,271 children (589 unaccompanied).

• Registration: At the beginning of 2026, following the fourth TP duration extension until 4 March 2027, the SAR announced that the renewal of the issued TP id. cards could be done both at SAR centers as well as the national police stations until 30 April 2026.

Content of temporary protection

• Housing: As of 31 December 2025, 2,840 vulnerable individuals remained accomodated under the state sponsored humanitarian aid programmes.
• Access to the labour market: The national Employment Agency stated that it does not have information about the overall number of the TP holders who were employed and working at the national labour market in 2025. The number of TP beneficiaries who found employment through governments employment services and schemes, who in 2022 were 2,198; 1,484 in 2023, 272 in 2024 and 315 in 2025.
• Access to education: In 2025/2026, the kindergartens admitted 1,307 children with temporary protection, whereas 5,379 pupils with temporary protection were enrolled in the schools, of whom 517 first-graders.

[1] Deutsche Welle, България има правителство: кабинетът Желязков пое властта, published on 16 January 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[2] Free Europe, САЩ санкционираха Пеевски и Божков заради корупция, 2 June 2021, available here in Bulgarian.

[3] bTV, Хронология на една раздяла : Игра на тронове в ДПС, published on 2 September 2024, available here in Bulgarian.

[4] Register of state security and intelligence agents during the communist period 1944-1989, available here in Bulgarian.

[5] Mediapool.bg, Доган: Имаме си обръч от фирми – те ни финансират, ние им помагаме, published on 26 June 2005, available here in Bulgarian.

[6] Institute for market Economics, Олелията около „обръчите” и „олигархиите”, published on 16 December 2006, available here in Bulgarian.

[7] Deutsche Welle, Моделът Доган-Пеевски: Заложници сме всички и самото ДПС, published on 28 August 2024, available here in Bulgarian, and also afera.bg, Ахмед Доган и обръчите от фирми, published on 4 November 2008, available here in Bulgarian.

[8] Deutsche Welle, Защо всички стрелят по ПП-ДБ, published on 16 June 2025, available here.

[9] Free Europe, Кирил Петков получи обвинение за опит за принуда, published on 28 March 2025, available here in Bulgarian, also, Mediapool.bg, Благомир Коцев: Вместо прокуратурата да търси истината, очаква да доказвам невинността си, published on 9 October 2025, available here in Bulgarian; sega.bg, Прокуратурата привика зам.-кмета на София по екологията, published on 9 October 2025, available here in Bulgarian. 

[10] bTV, Масови протести срещу властта в над 25 града у нас и в Европа, 10 December 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[11] clubz.bg, Исторически протест: 120-150 000 души се събраха в центъра на София, 10 December 2025, available in Bulgarian at: https://clubz.bg/168853.

[12] clubz.bg, Пак сме много 3.0, 10 December 2025, available at: https://clubz.bg/168850.

[13] Council of Ministers, Министър-председателят Росен Желязков депозира оставката на правителството, 11 December 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[14] Central Elections Commission, Archive of general elections, available at: https://www.cik.bg/bg/37

[15] State Gazette, Decree №58 for general elections, 19 February 2026, available here in Bulgarian.

[16] Deutsche Welle, Атанас Зафиров е новият лидер на БСП, 16 February 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[17] Banker.bg, Кабинетът Желязков освободи Мариана Тошева от поста председател на Държавната агенция за бежанците, published on 4 June 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[18] See, AIDA Country Report on Bulgaria – Update on 2022.

[19] See, AIDA Country Report on Bulgaria – Update on 2024.

[20] balkanec.bg, Иван Иванов е назначен за председател на Държавната агенция за бежанците, published on 4 June 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[21] marginalia.bg, Правозащитници и доброволци: Незабавно да се отмени назначението на Казаков за шеф на ДАБ, published on 9 January 2015, available here in Bulgarian.

[22] Deutsche Welle, Българската трагедия на сирийските бежанци, 12 October 2013, available here in Bulgarian. 

[23] Портал Култура, Бежанците в спирата на недоверието, 21 October 2013, available here in Bulgarian.

[24] News.bg, Уволниха шефа на Агенцията за бежанците, 22 February 2016, available here in Bulgarian.

[25] Legal Information Portal of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, Decision №883 from 19 December 2024 adopting Plan for Implementation by the Republic of Bulgaria of the European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, published on 21 January 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[26] Decision №833 from 19 December 2024 adopting Plan for Implementation by the Republic of Bulgaria of the European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, published on 21 January 2025, available here in Bulgarian, point 3.1.1.

[27] Decision №833 from 19 December 2024 adopting Plan for Implementation by the Republic of Bulgaria of the European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, published on 21 January 2025, available here in Bulgarian, point 2.1.1.

[28] Law amending the Law on Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria, published for consultations on 1 April 2026, ref. #12253-K, available in Bulgarian here.

[29] Teleconference with MOI Legal and Information Directorate on 2 March 2026.

[30] Portal for Public Consultations, Law on International Protection draft, published on 26 January 2026, available here in Bulgarian.

[31] Ibid.                                  

[32] Sega.bg, Полицаи от Австрия, Румъния и Унгария застанаха на границата ни с Турция, published on 3 February 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[33] MOI statistics, December 2025 Report, Migrants, who independently returned to the territory of neighbouring countries, Tables on page 2, published on 27 January 2026, available in Bulgarian at: https://bit.ly/49x8Dd3.

[34] GDBP-UNHCR-BHC, 2024 Annual Border Monitoring Report, page 7, published on 25 June 2025, available here.

[35] MOI statistics: 1,774 individuals apprehended at entry borders in 2025, of whom 1,600 individuals at the border with Türkiye (2024: 2,543 individuals, of whom 2,432 at the border with Türkiye), available in Bulgarian at: https://bit.ly/49x8Dd3.

[36] State Agency for Refugees, 2025 Annual statistics, communicated on 23 February 2026.

[37] See: https://ukraine.gov.bg/.

[38] flashnews.bg, България е дала временна закрила на 67 425 украинци, published on 16 August 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[39] Monthly Situation Report for December 2025: 28 asylum seekers; according to MOI statistics another 59 unaccompanied children referred by the Border police to Agency for Social Assistance, available in Bulgarian at: https://bit.ly/49x8Dd3.

[40] Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2025 Annual Refugee Status Determination Monitoring Report, 31 January 2026, available at: https://bit.ly/4bU9INC.

[41] §5 Additional Clauses, LAR: SAR can implement asylum procedures outside its premises at places designated for this purpose by an order of the SAR Chairperson prior the establishment of its transit centers; the Pastrogor transit center was open on 3 May 2012. Source: Citybuild, available in Bulgarian here.

[42] Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2025 Annual Refugee Status Determination Monitoring Report, 31 January 2026, available at: https://bit.ly/4bU9INC.

[43] Bulgarian National Television, ‘Началникът на отдел “Миграция” в СДВР е задържан с подкуп’, 20 January 2025, available in Bulgarian here.

[44] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026: 3,895 asylum seekers who applied in 2025 and 6,051 asylum seekers pending determination from 2024.

[45] Ibid.

[46] SAR, Annual statistics for 2025, available in Bulgarian at: https://bit.ly/3wDKXoU.

[47] SAR, №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026.

[48] Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2025 Annual Refugee Status Determination Monitoring Report, 31 January 2026, available at: https://bit.ly/4bU9INC.

[49] Previous refugee recognition rates: 0,7% in 2024; 1% in 2023; 2% in 2022; 4% in 2021; 13% in 2020; 13% in 2019; 15% in 2018; 14% in 2017; 25% in 2016; 76% in 2015; 69% in 2014.

[50] Previous subsidiary protection rates: 60% in 2024; 65% in 2023; 89% in 2022; 57% in 2021; 47% in 2020; 15% in 2019; 20% in 2018; 18% in 2017; 19% in 2016; 14% in 2015; 25% in 2014.

[51] Previous rejection rates: 39% in 2024; 39% in 2023; 9% in 2022; 39% in 2021; 39% in 2020; 71% in 2019; 65% in 2018; 68% in 2017; 56% in 2016; 10% in 2015; 6% in 2014.

[52] 2024 AIDA update: 10% overall recognition rate with 0.3% refugee recognition rate and 9.7% subsidiary protection rate and a 90% rejection rate; 2023 AIDA update: 14% overall recognition with 5% refugee recognition rate and 9% subsidiary protection rate vs 65% rejection / 2022 AIDA update: 49% overall recognition with 14% refugee recognition rate and 35% subsidiary protection rate vs 51% rejection rate.

[53] 1,134 discontinued procedures out of all 1,461 decisions taken in 2025 with respect to Afghan nationals.

[54] See, Table Statistics, pages 8-12 of this report: 1,461 Afghan decisions on the merits.

[55] Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, UN experts appalled by mass forced returns of Afghan nationals, published on 18 July 2025, available here.

[56] Article 15(c) of 2011/95/EC Directive.

^[57] Articles 30d to 30o Law on Legal Aid, as amended St.G. №13 from 7 February 2017.

^[58] National Legal Aid Bureau, tel. 0700 18 250.

[59] Article 25(1) and (2) of Law on Legal Aid.

^[60] Article 22(8) Law on Legal Aid.

^[61] §1(17) from Additional Clauses LAR, namely: children, unaccompanied children, disabled, elderly, pregnant, single parents taking care of underage children, victims of trafficking, persons with serious health issues, psychological disorders or persons who suffered torture, rape or other forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

[62] National Legal Aid Bureau, Regional centers for legal aid.

[63] Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, The BHC Legal Aid Reception for Refugees and Migrants ceased its operation on 1 January 2026, published on 12 January 2026, available here. 

[64] UNHCR Representation in Bulgaria, Legal Awareness, available here. 

[65] See, AIDA Country Updates on Bulgaria: Forth Update from October 2015, 2016 Update from February 2017, 2017 Update from February 2018, 2018 Update from January 2019, 2019 Update from February 2020, 2020 Update from February 2021 and 2021 Update from February 2022.

[66] 118^th Coordination meeting held on 22 December 2022.

[67] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026.

[68] See, AIDA Country Update from April 2025, Overview of the main changes since the previous report’s update.

[69] SAR reg. №АД-07-47 from 9 December 2024.

[70] SAR reg.№ЦУ-РД05-123/27.02.2024.

[71] See, the paragraph above, National context.

[72] 129^th Coordination meeting, 9 May 2024.

[73] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026: monthly disinfections.

[74] National Statistical Institute, Annual inflation rates: +5% in 2025; +2.2% in 2024; +9.5% in 2023; and +17% in 2022, available in Bulgarian here.

[75] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026: prices minus VAT, as follows, RRC Sofia: BGN 4.48; RRC Harmanli: BGN 5.45; RRC Banya: BGN 5.20; TC Pastrogor: BGN 5.01.

[76] SAR, Order No 31-310, 31 March 2015, issued by the Chairperson Nikola Kazakov.

[77] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026.

[78] Ibid.

[79] DW, ‘След побоя в София: спусъкът с “Мигранти вън!’, 11 March 2024, available in Bulgarian here; 24 Hours, ‘Рехав протест против бежанците се проведе в София, 31 March 2024, available in Bulgarian here; BTV, Протест срещу бежанците в Харманли: Хората настояват те да бъдат преместени извън града, 22 march 2024, available in Bulgarian here; BNR, Жители на Харманли отново протестираха срещу бежанския център, 6 April 2024, available in Bulgarian here.

[80] Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, reg.No.Б-67 from 4 August 2022.

[81] Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, reg.No.Б-88 from 18 September 2023.

[82] SAR, reg. No. №РД05-31 from 15 January 2024; SAR reg. №АД-07-7 from 14 January 2025.

[83] 127^th Coordination meeting, held on 28 December 2023.

[84] Article 14, para 5 of the Law on Ministry of Interior, St.G. №33 from 12 April 2024; Bulgarian national television, ‘МВР ще охранява центровете за бежанци, решиха депутатите’, available in Bulgarian here.

[85] SAR, 2024 Annual Activity Report, published in May 2025, available here in Bulgarian.

[86] SAR, Откриване на сигурна зона за непридружени деца-бежанци в РПЦ-Харманли, 16 May 2024, available in Bulgarian here.

[87] 2025: 573 unaccompanied children; 2024: 2,601 unaccompanied children; 2023: 3,843 unaccompanied children / 2022: 3,348 unaccompanied children / 2021: 3,172 unaccompanied children.

[88] SAR reg. №АД-07-7 from 14 January 2025.

[89] 2025: 181 substantive decisions, 845 discontinuations of procedure due to absconding.

[90] 2025: 7% or 41 (11 asylum seeking and 30 granted protection) of 573 unaccompanied children; 2024: 3% or 62 children (4 asylum seeking and 58 granted protection) of 2,061 unaccompanied children; 2023: 43 children (2 asylum seeking and 41 granted protection); 2022: 26 children (2 asylum seeking and 24 granted protection).

[91] Article 29 (9) LAR.

[92] Article 29 (1) LAR.

[93] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026.

[94] SAR, Order No 31-310, 31 March 2015, issued by the Chairperson Nikola Kazakov.

[95] SAR, Order [No. and date unspecified] 2025, issued by the Chairperson Ivan Ivanov.

[96] SAR, Order [No. and date unspecified] 2025, issued by the Chairperson Ivan Ivanov.

[97] Law on Asylum and Refugees (LAR), Article 29 (3).

[98] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026.

[99] Employment Agency, reg. No. РД-08-16 from 7 January 2026.

[100] Ibid.

[101] 2024: 4 working/6 calendar days; 2023: 5 working/7 calendar days; 2022: 6 calendar/4 working days; 2021: 7 calendar/5 working days; 2020: 8 calendar/6 working days; 2019: 11 calendar/9 working days; 2018: 9 calendar/7 working days; 2017: 19 calendar/15 working days; 2016: 9 calendar/7 working days; 2015: 10 calendar/8 working days; 2014: 11 calendar/9 working days; 2013: 45 days/32 working days.

[102] Article 58(4) LAR, Article 6(2) APD: 6 working days.

[103] 2024: 3,895 asylum seekers; 2023: 22,518; 2022: 20,407 asylum seekers / 2023: 22,518 asylum seekers.

[104] Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2025 Annual Refugee Status Determination Monitoring Report, 31 January 2026, available at: https://bit.ly/4bU9INC.

[105] 6 working or 8 calendar days as per Article 58(4) LAR in conjunction with Article 6(1) APD.

[106] See, AIDA updates on Bulgaria in 2019 to 2021.

[107] BHC 2025 Annual RSD Monitoring report, 1.1.2. Procedure at the police detention centers, page 8, available at: https://bit.ly/3Y3WzJJ.

[108] Article 45b LAR.

[109] State Gazette No.80 from 16 October 2015, enforced on 1 January 2016.

[110] Until December 2025: a special compartment allocated in Busmantsi detention center’s premises; starting from December 2025: Pastrogor transit center.

[111] SAR, reg. №ПО-02-115 from 22 February 2026.

[112] 2024: 86 days; 2023: 78 days; 2022: 56 days; 2021: 86 days; 2020: 91 days; 2019: 252 days; 2018: 192 days, 2017: 202 days.

^[113] Article 90 (1) Law on Civil Registration.

[114] State Gazette No.85 from 8 October 2024.

[115] Article 93 (6), as well as §1 Additional Clauses Law on Civil Registration.

[116] MOI, Identity Documents Directorate, reg. №812104-1103 from 10 February 2026.

[117] Statistics provided by the SAR Deputy Chair on Social Matters on 3 February 2025; 2024: 2 beneficiaries of international protection; 2023: 22 beneficiaries of international protection; 2022: 20 beneficiaries; 2021: 83 beneficiaries.

[118] COM №278 from 2 May 2025, available in Bulgarian here.

[119] Articles 3 and 4 Law on Persons and Entities: 0-13 minors / 14-17 adolescents.

[120] SAR, Rules and procedures on the accommodation of unaccompanied children granted international protection in foster families, social or integrated socio-medical care facilities for children of a residential type, adopted in October 2022.

[121] Article 42(5) LAR, State Gazette No. 89 from 16 October 2020.