The Chapter: Content of Temporary Protection in Türkiye contains sections on:
A. Status and residence
B. Family reunification
C. Movement and mobility
D. Housing
E. Employment and education
F. Social welfare
G. Health care
H. Guarantees for vulnerable groups
Overview
The temporary protection framework laid down by the TPR, first and foremost, provides a domestic legal status to beneficiaries granting legal stay in Türkiye;[1] protection from punishment for illegal entry or presence[2] and protection from refoulement.[3]
The evolution of the debate about and policies for integrating Syrian refugees can be stated as follows: The first four years was an ’emergency period,’ until the announcement of the EU-Türkiye statement in 2015. The time following 2016 was designated as the period of integration policies, implying that integration became a focal point of debate.[4] This period saw increased migration in Türkiye as a result of the expectation that the crisis would not be addressed quickly. Participation in educational possibilities, specific needs of women and children, child marriage, child labour, and problems of persons with chronic diseases, the disabled, and the elderly were the focus areas of this period. In this setting, protection has gained relevance, as has access to livelihood and the labour market. 2019 instead marked the start of a third period, focusing on social cohesion and returns.[5] In 2019 PMM published the Cohesion Strategy and National Action Plan, which addressed six subject areas: social cohesion, information, education, health, labour market, and social support. As the five-year plan is due to end in 2023, UNHCR is collaborating with PMM on the drafting of its revised Strategy and National Action Plan.[6] In 2023, the policies overlooked social cohesion, instead the priorities were given to (voluntary) return, border management, effective detection of irregular migrants within the country, and deportation. As of December 2024, the main policy focuses on voluntarily, safe, dignified and regular returns.[7]
The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment was often targeting Syrians as the main refugee group in Türkiye. Türkiye’s current economic crisis has resulted in immigrants’ being made scapegoats and competitors in an increasingly narrowing labour market while their presence is seen as an unnecessary burden on the welfare state. Furthermore, rising anti-government sentiment has encouraged increased criticism of the government’s open-door policy towards refugees.[8] In 2023, the rising anti-migrant discourse led institutions interacting with migrants, particularly municipalities, to face pressures driven by fears of losing votes and negative citizen reactions[9]. This also resulted in reluctance among local companies to hire Syrians, landlords refusing to rent to Syrians or pressuring existing tenants to leave, and the removal of Arabic signs in some cities[10]. Following the earthquakes, false accusations against Syrians, such as looting and illegal border crossings, were widely disseminated by political leaders and on social media, intensifying hostility and calls for forced return.[11] The anti-migrant discourse, fuelled by hate speech, damaged social cohesion. (See Content of International Protection).
In late June and early July 2024, a wave of anti-Syrian unrest broke out in Kayseri following allegations that a Syrian man had sexually abused a young Syrian girl[12]. According to the official statement of the Kayseri Governorship, the suspect was taken into custody and the child was placed under protection. However, stakeholders in Kayseri underlined that there was no clear or detailed information publicly shared about the incident, and the truth of the allegations remained uncertain. Some expressed concerns that the issue may have been suppressed or inadequately clarified by the authorities. Despite the uncertainty, the incident quickly escalated into widespread unrest, during which protestors raided the homes of Syrian families, set vehicles on fire, and engaged in acts of violence. Fourteen police officers and one firefighter were injured, and a broadcast ban was imposed concerning both the incident and the subsequent events. The Minister of Interior announced that 67 people had been detained in connection with the unrest, which continued into early July.
Stakeholders reported that the violence caused widespread fear among Syrians, many of whom refrained from leaving their homes for an extended period. Syrian residents reportedly tried to conceal vehicle license plates beginning with “MA” to avoid being targeted. The attacks led to extensive property damage and deepened feelings of insecurity among the Syrian community. Following the unrest, stakeholders observed that the PDMM in Kayseri initiated a practice of systematically collecting judicial records of all foreigners residing in the province. Based on these records—regardless of the nature or outcome of the proceedings—deportation decisions were issued, and entire families were taken to removal centers. Even in cases where only one family member had a judicial record, including records that ended in acquittal, non-prosecution, or suspension of the sentence, deportation measures were reportedly applied to the entire family. In many cases, stakeholders reported that temporary protection IDs were cancelled once individuals were taken to removal centers, triggering cascading rights deprivations. Affected persons, including children, infants, and other vulnerable individuals with no criminal background or public order risk, lost access to essential services such as education and healthcare. Their de-registration from the temporary protection system rendered them irregular migrants, increasing the risk of further detention or deportation. This situation created an atmosphere of fear and legal uncertainty. According to stakeholders, some Syrians—fearing they would be deported regardless of their actions—voluntarily approached PDMM offices and requested return to Syria. They reported that many of these requests were driven not by genuine willingness, but by feelings of insecurity and inevitability. Stakeholders also noted that the events had a silencing effect on the Syrian community across the region. Reports were received from nearby provinces as well, where similar patterns of fear and self-isolation among Syrians emerged. Many individuals reportedly began to believe that the authorities intended to remove them from the country and would find a justification to do so regardless of legal safeguards or personal circumstances.[13]
In early July 2024, human rights organizations including the Human Rights Association (İHD), the Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD), and the Contemporary Lawyers Association (ÇHD) conducted a field visit to Kayseri to document the impacts of anti-Syrian violence following the unrest that broke out in the city. Based on testimonies collected from affected residents, including Syrian shopkeepers and their families, the organizations documented extensive property damage, physical assaults, and threats targeting Syrians. According to interviews with a Syrian businessman, and his son, approximately 50 shops and dozens of vehicles were damaged or destroyed. Many Syrians fled the city for safety, either to Syria or to other Turkish provinces. They reported that the attacks included armed perpetrators and incidents involving Molotov cocktails thrown at homes. Another Syrian butcher confirmed that his shop was looted and burned, and although he possessed security footage, the police only took photographs and made no damage assessment. Stakeholders reported that the violence led to widespread fear, disruption of daily life, and a collapse in economic activity, particularly for Syrian-owned businesses. Many Syrians, especially those residing in districts like Eskişehir Bağları and Sahabiye, were unable to leave their homes or go to work. One Syrian woman testified that she had not been able to obtain essential medication for her mother or food for her family due to movement restrictions and the absence of support. Syrians described being targeted for speaking Arabic in public spaces, and noted that attackers coordinated their actions through social media, announcing planned assaults on specific neighborhoods. The lack of early intervention by law enforcement was a recurring concern; many victims stated that police officers did not intervene during the first two days of attacks and treated the assailants as if they were staging peaceful demonstrations.
The human rights delegation also highlighted systemic failures in the state’s response. Authorities reportedly did not conduct damage assessments or provide information on compensation mechanisms. There were no clear measures to address Syrians’ urgent needs such as food and medical access. Furthermore, no transparency was observed regarding the progress or effectiveness of criminal investigations into the perpetrators. A public statement by the Minister of Interior characterized the attackers as “disturbed, underage, or with criminal records,” which stakeholders criticized as an attempt to individualize the violence while ignoring the organized, xenophobic nature of the attacks. Concerns were raised that the real instigators may again benefit from impunity, as seen in previous incidents. The attacks had lasting consequences on the safety, dignity, and legal security of Syrians living in Kayseri. Testimonies revealed that many individuals began hiding their license plates, stopped commuting, or contemplated leaving the country altogether. Some sectors in the local economy were reportedly disrupted due to the inability of Syrian workers to reach their workplaces. Local media sources stated that several factories suspended production until at least 8 July. On 3 July, the monitoring team observed that major social media platforms were restricted, reportedly upon the request of security forces. Syrians interviewed during this period noted that the platform bans deepened their sense of fear and isolation, as they were unable to contact loved ones or access reliable information during the unrest.[14]
Following the unrest in Kayseri in late June and early July 2024, anti-Syrian sentiment quickly spread to other provinces, triggering coordinated acts of violence and intimidation. The combination of social media posts showing attacks on Turkish symbols in areas of northern Syria under Türkiye’s control, alongside the alleged abuse incident in Kayseri, led to widespread protests marked by xenophobic slogans and targeted aggression against Syrians. According to media reports, violent demonstrations took place in Hatay (particularly in Reyhanlı and Kırıkhan), Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa (Akçakale district), and again in Kayseri. Protesters attacked businesses and homes believed to be owned by Syrians, with chants such as “We don’t want refugees” and “Suriyelileri istemiyoruz” reported across different cities. In Hatay’s Reyhanlı district, large crowds gathered in front of the municipality building on the evening of 1 July, chanting anti-refugee slogans while waving Turkish flags. Security forces, including riot police and TOMA vehicles, were deployed and several streets near the municipality were closed to traffic. Demonstrators also targeted the Çarşamba Pazarı area, known for its concentration of Syrian-owned shops. As tensions escalated, many Syrian business owners shut down their stores and left the area to avoid confrontation. In Adana’s Seyhan district, a group of individuals on motorcycles attempted to enter neighborhoods with significant Syrian populations, including Kocavezir and Mirzaçelebi, in a convoy formation. The group displayed Turkish flags and shouted anti-Syrian slogans while trying to stage a procession. Police forces intervened and blocked their entry into these neighborhoods but did not prevent the group from driving through other parts of the city while continuing their demonstrations.[15]
An interesting report from March 2022 on urban refugees in Marmara[16] gave the municipality view of integration in Türkiye. The report studied the situation for Syrian temporary protection holders in thirteen provinces and 94 municipalities and challenges. It found that the three most common problems that municipalities encounter regarding immigrants and refugees are the lack of a budget and legal problems arising from the limitations in the legislation related to their jurisdiction, a lack of data, and negative reactions from local people. The main problems experienced by Syrian temporary protection holders are poverty, being employed as unqualified, cheap labour and housing. Syrian refugees most often request help from municipalities with financial and other aid, employment and shelter.
A recent study[17] reported the most challenging issues faced by Syrians are (1) movement restrictions that prevent them from relocating within the country, (2) difficulties in continuing to reside in their current homes due to increased demand for housing, high rent cost and financial insecurity (3) obtaining or renewing legal documentation, (4) disparities in aid distribution, and (5) experiencing hate speech and violence from police officers. In addition to those mentioned in both studies, the fear of return and having inactive identity cards forcing them to being undocumented hinders their access to services.[18]
International NGOs have also been active in border provinces since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. Currently, the scope of foreign NGOs’ activities is limited and under close monitoring by the competent PDMM, as organisations need to obtain permission to operate in Türkiye and renew it regularly.[19] According to the list published and updated on 26 April 2023 by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, there are 60 registered INGOs operating in migration sector in Türkiye. This trend continued in 2024. Following December 2024, there was a noticeable increase in the number of NGOs and business representatives expressing interest in visiting Syria to explore potential activities. For instance, Refugees Association (Mülteciler Derneği) published a report based on their visit to Syria between 23 and 25 February 2025.[20]
EU Funding Projects in Türkiye[21]
The EU continued to support Türkiye’s huge efforts to accommodate the largest refugee population in the world in 2023 despite political unrest. By the end of 2020, the EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye (FRIT) had contracted its whole 6 billion EUR operational budget, and by August 2021, more than EUR 4.2 billion had been distributed. In addition to the 6 billion EUR already raised under the FRIT in 2020 and 2021, 585 million EUR from the EU budget was set aside for humanitarian assistance as well as to continue two significant cash support programmes for refugees. In June 2021, the Commission suggested allocating an additional 3 billion EUR in aid to Syrian refugees and host communities in Türkiye. But the size of the refugee population in Türkiye—particularly after the arrival of Afghan nationals starting in the summer of 2021—requires much more work from the international community to handle the growing requirements brought on by the refugees’ prolonged stay in the nation. [22] For 2023 and 2024, the EU has pledged over 2 billion EUR in support for Syrian refugees and their host communities. It was stressed that the EU would continue to collaborate with Turkiye to ensure the delivery of cross-border aid to Syria.[23] As part of the MFF mid-term review package, the European Council on 1 February 2024 agreed to increase by 1.5 billion EUR the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve for the period 2024-2027.[24]
The sustainability of FRIT-funded projects varies. Infrastructure projects, such as schools and hospitals, have been integrated into the Turkish national systems, with operational costs covered by the national budget. However, socio-economic support projects have struggled with sustainability. While 15 community centres continued operations with alternative funding, social cohesion activities and vocational training ceased due to a lack of funds.
The earthquakes in February 2023 exacerbated challenges for refugees in Türkiye. Both the PIKTES and SIHHAT projects were significantly impacted by the earthquakes. Schools in the earthquake-affected provinces were closed; some were heavily damaged or destroyed and equipment and provisions were lost. In the case of SIHHAT, approximately 45 of the 102 (extended) migrant health centres were damaged. The Turkish Ministry of National Education did not provide data on Syrian children and children from host communities, which limited the audit’s ability to assess the impact of FRIT education projects. With only 65% of Syrian pupils in formal education as of January 2023, integrating one million refugee children remains a significant challenge due to an insufficient number of teachers and schools. The Supporting Migrant Health Services in Türkiye (SIHHAT I) project identified the need for one migrant health unit per 4,000 refugees. However, 45 out of 102 migrant health centres were damaged in the earthquakes, disrupting healthcare services. Temporary units were established to mitigate the impact, and by December 2023, several centres had reopened. In 2024, seven new Migrant Health Centres and 45 new Migrant Health Units opened in 13 provinces.[25]
The EU delegation identified a need for an additional 632.4 million EUR to complete projects as planned. Prior to the earthquakes, 554 million EUR was already requested to cover inflation and increased construction costs. Post-earthquake, cash-assistance programs and agricultural employment support projects required further funding. The earthquakes also led to significant project delays, with 20 out of 33 ongoing FRIT projects needing extensions of 1 to 3 years.
In February 2024, the EU announced an additional 26 million EUR in humanitarian aid to support vulnerable refugees and earthquake-affected communities in Türkiye. This funding includes 4 million EUR earmarked for education in emergencies and aims to address critical needs such as water, sanitation, hygiene, and specialised healthcare services. The EU’s continued support, in collaboration with Turkish authorities, underscores its commitment to assisting the most vulnerable populations based on their humanitarian needs. For basic needs, a further EUR 43.2 million was contracted to support recovery efforts, including providing emergency cash assistance.[26]
The Facility has significantly contributed to infrastructure support, particularly in education and municipal services[27], resulting in the construction of 117 schools and the installation of 8,700 smartboards in primary and secondary schools. Additionally, the Facility has improved energy efficiency through solar panel installations on school rooftops. In municipal infrastructure, projects have enhanced essential services, including water supply, sanitation, and waste management, exemplified by the completion of a mechanical biological waste treatment facility in Gaziantep. These efforts have collectively improved the living conditions and service accessibility for both refugees and host communities.[28] In terms of integration, Türk Kızılay runs 19 community centres for migrants in different locations across the country[29].
It is hard to find a detailed breakdown of the funding, and the funded projects have not been designed by refugees nor, consulted to refugees to identify their priorities, there is a lack of refugees’ meaningful involvement in project designs, and identifying the priorities for the communities.[30] In 2024, the same trend of a decrease in funding for Türkiye as in 2023 was confirmed. This was due to the country’s situation no longer being considered as a priority by several donors, given the several crises occurring worldwide.[31] Funding from Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations and Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations for these services has significantly decreased, with humanitarian funding dropping from EUR 43 million in 2022 to EUR 13 million in 2024.[32] Moreover, two significant developments—the regime change in Syria in December 2024 and executive decisions by the second-term Trump administration affecting USAID and PRM funding—led to a further decline in funding in 2025.
[1] Article 25 TPR.
[2] Article 5 TPR.
[3] Article 6 TPR.
[4] Içduygu, Ahmet and Simsek, Dogus (2016) Syrian refugees in Türkiye: towards integration policies. Turkish Policy Quarterly, 15(3), 59-69, available here
[5] SGDD-ASAM and UN Women, Needs assessment of Syrian women and girls under temporary protection status in Türkiye, June 2018, available here, 65.
[6] UNHCR, Türkiye Factsheet, September 2023, available here.
[7] T.C. Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, Gönüllü, Güvenli, Onurlu ve Düzenli Geri Dönüş
[8] Evren Balta Ezgi Elçi Deniz Sert, Political Party Representation of Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Turkey, December 2022, available here.
[9] Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Göçmen Mahallelerinde Yaşam: Türkiye’de 2010 Sonrası Göçler ve Göçmenlerin Toplumsal Katılımı, November 2023, available here.
[10] Ibid, & information provided by stakeholders, March-April 2024.
[11] Özdemir & Ağırday, Quakes Do Strike Refugees: Hyper-precarity of Syrians in Turkey, MiReKoc Working Paper Series, April 2023, available here.
[12] Euronews, Kayseri’de çocuk istismarı iddiası: Suriyelilerin iş yerleri hedef alındı; bir sığınmacı gözaltında, 01.07.2024, available here.
[13] Information provided by multiple stakeholders, April 2025.
[14] Suriyelilere Yönelik Kayseri’de Yaşanan Irkçı saldırılar Özel Raporu, 09.07.2024, available here.
[15] Medyascope, Kayseri’de başlayan gerilim Suriye kaynaklı görüntülerle başka illere de sıçradı, 02.07.2024, available here.
[16] Marmara Municipalities Union, Urban Refugees of Marmara: Process Management of Municipalities, 9 March 2022. Summary of the report available in Turkish here.
[17] 11.11.11, Syrian refugees in Türkiye Community Perspectives on Basic Rights and Support, January 2024, available here.
[18] Information provided by stakeholders, March – April 2024.
[19] For a list of active organisations, see Ministry of Interior, Foreign CSOs permitted to operate in Türkiye, available here.
[20] Mülteciler Derneği, 2025 Saha Gözlem Raporu: Suriye “Esad gitti ama Suriye hala karanlık.”, 11.03.2025 available here.
[21] This section is based on the information from several resources: DG NEAR EU Support to Refugees in Türkiye, available here & EC, Seventh Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, COM(2023) 543 final, 22.9.2023, Brussels & EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS, Special report 06/2024: The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured
[22] ICMPD, ‘Migration Outlook 2022 Western Balkans & Turkey Nine migration issues to look out for in 2022’, 2022, available here.
[23] AA, ‘EU pledges over $2B at donors conference for Syria’, 15 June 2022, available here.
[24] EC, Commission signs €400 million agreement with Türkiye to support its recovery after the 2023 earthquakes, 07.02.2024, available here.
[25] EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye, The Facility Results Framework Monitoring Report No. 13, December 2024, available here.
[26] Ibid.
[27] EC, Seventh Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, COM(2023) 543 final, 22.9.2023, Brussels.
[28] EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye, The Facility Results Framework Monitoring Report No. 11, June 2023, available here EC, Seventh Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, COM(2023) 543 final, 22.9.2023, Brussels.
[29] IOM, ‘Göçmen ve Mülteci Destek Faaliyetleri , 2023, available here
[30] Information provided by stakeholder, March – April 2024.
[31] Information provided by stakeholder, March – April 2024.
[32] EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye, The Facility Results Framework Monitoring Report No. 13, December 2024, available here.